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NOTES ON TWO ELEMENTARY EVOLUTIONARY
GAMES
JACK MORAVA
Abstract. Thus spoke the wise Queen Delores, saying, “I have studied
mathematics. I will question this young man, in my tent tonight, and
in the morning I will report the truth as to his pretensions”.
Jurgen, James Branch Cabell (1919), Ch. XXXII: Jurgen proves it
by mathematics
Evolutionary game theory [3] defines something like a functor from the clas-
sical theory of games to dynamical systems, imagining biological entities
whose rate of reproduction is proportional to their success at playing the
game in question. It is a beautiful and accessible subject; these notes on two
interesting examples grew out of JHU’s 2007 BioCalc I course, and I’d like to
thank the students there for their interest and forebearance. This work was
also suggested by DARPA’s Fundamental Problems of Biology initiative.
1. The Battle of the Sexes
” C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre . . . ”
Marshal Pierre Bosquet, Balaclava 1854
1.1 In the evolutionary version of Richard Dawkins’ toy model for marriage
markets as asymmetric two-player games, the rate of reproduction of a pop-
ulation type is proportional to its success at beating the mean expectation
for the game. Following Hofbauer and Sigmund [3 §10.2], this is expressed
by a system
x˙k = xk · [(Ay)k − x · Ay] ,
y˙k = yk · [(Bx)k − y ·Bx] .
of ‘replicator’ equations, in which there are two types of players: those of
type I (males) characterized by a state vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) in a unit
simplex in some space of strategies, and type II (females) defined similarly
by a vector y = (y1, . . . , ym).
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The details of the model are specified by matrices A,B: a type I player
choosing mixed strategy x against a type II player choosing strategy y re-
ceives payoff x ·Ay, while his type II ‘opponent’ [the game is not zero-sum!]
receives payoff y · Bx. In the simplest version of the game both types of
players have two strategies:
x = (x, 1− x), y = (y, 1 − y) .
The traditional terminology is that x(t) is the proportion of ‘fast’ males and
y(t) is the proportion of ‘slow’ females; this choice of parameters foregrounds
analogies with a Lotka-Volterra system.
The payoff matrices are
A =
[
0 G
G− E − 1
2
C G− 1
2
C
]
and
B =
[
0 G− E − 1
2
C
G− C G− 1
2
C
]
.
In the four possible types of interaction, a fast (‘macho’?) male in an en-
counter with fast female receives payoff G while the female receives G− C;
when a fast male encounters a slow (‘coy’?) female both receive payoff
0. When a slow male encounters a fast female, both players receive payoff
G − 1
2
C, and in an encounter between a slow male and a slow female both
players receive payoff G−E − 1
2
C. The model assumes that
0 < E < G < C < 2(G − E) ;
the engagement cost E (borne equally by the players) is less than the (indi-
vidual) payoff G for successful reproduction, and the total cost C of repro-
duction, though bigger than the payoff for a single participant, is less than
the total payoff to both parties, less the total cost of engagement.
1.2 The resulting system
x˙ = x(1− x)[1
2
C + (E −G)y]
y˙ = y(1− y)[−E + (C + E −G)x]
of replicator equations is completely integrable, with five critical points,
hyperbolic at the corners of the unit square1 and a more interesting elliptic
point at
X =
E
E −G+ C
, Y =
C
2(G− E)
.
1Corresponding to classical models: the Garden of Eden, the Summer of Love, Total
War, and Christian Heaven . . .
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The linearization near this critical point is defined by the Hessian or Jaco-
bian matrix of the right-hand side of this system; it has purely imaginary
eigenvalues Λ satisfying
Λ2 = −
CE(2(G− E)− C)(C −G)
4(G − E)(C + E −G)
.
Any point in the interior of the square lies on a closed orbit, whose period
approaches T = 2pi|Λ|−1 at the fixed point. The desire to understand this
relatively complicated ‘observable’ was the initial motivation for this note.
1.3 Proposition (E,G,C) 7→ (X,Y ) extends to a map
[E : G : C] 7→ [EC : 2E(G − E) : C(E −G+ C) : 2(G− E)(E −G+ C)]
from P2 to a quadric surface P1 × P1 ⊂ P3.
Proof: If we write [Z0 : Z1 : Z2 : Z3] for the coordinates in P3, then
evidently X = Z0Z
−1
2
, Y = Z1Z
−1
3
; in other words, the map above is
the composition of the map from Dawkins’ space of economic parameters
E,G,C to psychosocial parameters X,Y followed by the Segre embedding
(x0, x1)× (y0, y1) 7→ (x0y0, x0y1, x1y0, x1y1)
of the quadric surface Z0Z3 = Z1Z2; for example, [1 : 1 : 0] 7→ [1 : 0 : 0 : 0]
and [0 : 1 : 1] 7→ [1 : 1 : 0 : 1]. 
The function Λ is homogeneous of weight one in the economic parameters;
its value thus depends on a choice of units. This issue is familiar from
physics: similar considerations in the case of the van der Waals model for
liquid-gas transitions, for example, led historically to thermodynamics’ law
of corresponding states [2 §6.3].
Corollary
Λ2 = (2Z3)
−1(Z0 − Z1)
in units defined by the geometric mean of C and C −G.
[More precisely, we have
Λ2 =
Z0 − Z1
2Z3
· C(C −G) ,
and in ‘natural’ units such that C(C −G) = 1, ie
G = C − C−1
we can omit the factor on the right.]
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2. Progressives and Conservatives
“If I can’t sell it gonna sit down on it,
never catch me givin it away!”
Ruth Brown, Fantasy Records (1989)
2.1 Similar techniques can be used to analyze the much simpler game defined
by payoff matrices
A = aH,B = bHT
with
H =
[
0 η((b− a)
η(a− b) 0
]
,
where η(x) is the Heaviside function (= 1 if x > 0, = 1
2
if x = 0, and = 0
otherwise; I’ll assume that a and b are both positive, and that a 6= b to
exclude trivial cases. In this example there are again two types of players,
with strategy vectors (x, 1 − x) and (y, 1 − y) as above, now interpreted
as the proportion of progressive (resp. conservative) participants of type I
(resp II); with payoff parameters a, b for the two types.
An encounter between a progressive and a conservative yields zero, unless
the conservative receives the larger payoff. An encounter between two pro-
gressives yields payoff a for the type I player and payoff b for the type II
player, and an encounter between two conservatives produces nothing for
either. This is therefore a rather silly game: the progressive agrees with
anything that benefits anybody, while the conservative strategy amounts to
pure bullying; but because the game is not zero-sum, it is not completely
trivial.
2.2 The obvious symmetries of the payoff matrices result in very simple
replicator equations
x˙ = ax(1− x) η(b− a)
y˙ = by(1− y) η(a− b) .
One or the other of these equations is thus trivial, depending on the relative
sizes of a and b: the proportion of participants whose payoff is larger (let’s
call them fat cats) does not change with time, while the group with lower
payoff (underdogs?) become more progressive, following a logistic growth
pattern; the population thus evolves toward political polarization.
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